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Abstract
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a
quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof
core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public good
provision level, and its cost-sharing. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public good
economies but does not usually achieve global eciency. The FRP-Core has support
from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to
the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston,
1987) of a dynamic game with players' participation decisions followed by a common
agency game of public goods provision. We illustrate various properties of the FRP-
Core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public good shrinks
to zero as the economy is replicated.
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The free-riding problem is a central issue in collective decision-makings. Examples include
lobbies that are formed to seek a government's protection. Firms in an industry may form
a lobby to in
uence the government's trade and industrial policies; but as long as sucient
number of rms participate in the lobbying (thus the resulting protection level is reasonably
high), some rms may want to stay out and free-ride on others. Free-riding incentives also
exist in other collective decision makings, such as rms' cartel formation and international
agreement to tackle the global climate change. Eectiveness of lobbies, cartels, and interna-
tional agreements all depend on the composition of the active participants in these activities,
which is heavily in
uenced by free-riding incentives.
These problems can be regarded as pure public goods provision problems with voluntary
participation. Players are faced with a choice between actively participating in a public
good provision and free-riding on the contributors; if a player participates (and only in such
cases), she needs to share the cost of public goods provision although she can in
uence the
level of provision. A notable feature of the public goods provision problem is that expansion
of the contribution group is always benecial to everybody. Since benets from public goods
will be extended beyond contribution group members, however, there always exist free-riding
incentives, which generally grow as a contribution group expands. Therefore, it is important
to consider potential coalitional deviations that are immune to further deviations. A proposal
of membership expansion, which is regarded as a coalitional deviation, may not be immune
to free-riding by the incumbents, however, so that some of these Pareto-improving proposals
may not be credible. To dene an appropriate solution in the public good provision problem
with voluntary participation, therefore, we must consider all possible coalitional deviations
that are immune to further deviations.
In this paper, employing a quasi-linear economy, or equivalently a transferable utility
(TU) framework, we propose the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core) for the public goods
provision problem with voluntary participation, which is an institution-free solution concept
with farsightedness. The FRP-Core is a hybrid solution concept as it is required to be
1immune not only to coalitional deviations to create an alternative contribution group (in
line with cooperative game theory) but to unilateral free-riding deviations (in line with non-
cooperative game theory); the FRP-Core can be considered as the core without binding
agreements. It determines a contribution group to form, public good provision level, and a
payo allocation within the group.
The FRP-Core is dened in the following way. First, for every possible contribution
group, we collect all allocations such that (i) they are immune to all coalitional deviations
by subsets of the group to reorganize the contribution group, and (ii) no member of the
group is better o by unilaterally opting out of the group to free-ride. These allocations
constitute the set of internally stable allocations for the contribution group. Second, for
each contribution group, we collect all internally stable allocations that are not blocked by
any other contribution group's deviations with their internally stable allocations. The free-
riding-proof core (FRP-Core) is the union of such stable sets over all possible contribution
groups. In the pure public goods economy, the FRP-Core is always nonempty (Proposition
2).
The FRP-Core does not only have intuitive appeal, but also has nice and useful corre-
spondences with cooperative and noncooperative game solution (equilibrium) concepts. On
one hand, the FRP-Core is equivalent to the core when the set of feasible allocations are
restricted to the ones of free-riding-proof (Theorem 1). Thus, the FRP-Core is a natural and
appealing solution concept from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory, which provides
solutions that are robust to changes in detailed specication of discussed situations. On
the other hand, the FRP-Core is equivalent to the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple
extensive-form game such that players individually decides whether or not to participate in
the public good contribution group in the rst stage, followed by a common agency game
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) of public goods provision with players in the contribution
group as principals and the government as the agent. This equivalence provides a support
for the FRP-Core from the viewpoint of noncooperative game theory.
The equivalence result requires more explanations. The common agency game introduced
2by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is a game in which players (principals) simultaneously
oer their individual contribution schedules to the agent to try to aect the agent's action
in the interest of themselves.1 To rene the Nash equilibrium, which tends to yield a large
equilibrium set due to coordination problem, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) propose the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), a communication-based equilibrium concept for
the common agency game. In the rst stage of our extensive-form game, players individ-
ually decide whether or not to participate in the contribution group, which also involves
the coordination problem. Therefore, it is natural for us to adopt a dynamic extension of
CPNE, which is the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE; Bernheim, Peleg,
and Whinston, 1987). The equilibrium concept PCPNE ts particularly well to the public
goods provision problems in which players may communicate with each other as to whether
or not they join the contribution group.
The equilibrium concept PCPNE has a few merits: (i) it determines a contribution
group, public goods provision level, and its cost-sharing altogether, (ii) it allows players to
propose a (coalitional) deviation plan in which they coordinate their strategies (including
the ones in subgames) through communications, and (iii) it requires credibility of proposed
deviation plans so that no credible deviation remains in equilibrium. CPNE and PCPNE are
strategy proles that are immune to (recursively dened) credible group deviations with their
strategies coordinated. A credible deviation is a deviation that is immune to further nested
credible deviations. Credibility requirement enables us to exclude noncredible proposals of
membership expansion from consideration. We show the equivalence between the FRP-
Core and PCPNEs of the aforementioned extensive-form game of public goods provision
(Theorem 2). In contrast, the Appendix C examines some other natural candidates of
equilibrium concept such as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and some other forms of
the public goods provision game, and shows that those other equilibrium allocations do not
coincide with the FRP-Core allocations. What distinguishes PCPNE from other solution
concepts is property (ii) in the above. Players in a deviation group can discuss which
1This game has been widely applied to political economy models with lobbying, especially in the eld of
international trade (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
3(credible) strategies they take in the following subgames, which eliminates ungrounded fear
about possibly unfavorable consequences of the deviation and hence solve the coordination
problem.
We examine properties of the set of FRP-Core allocations with a simple example in which
players dier only in their willingness-to-pay for a public good, and show that (i) there are
multiple possible equilibrium contribution groups in general, (ii) an equilibrium contribution
group may not include the player with the highest willingness-to-pay, and (iii) equilibrium
contribution-group members may not be consecutive in their willingness-to-pay, i.e., there
may be an outsider whose willingness-to-pay lies between those of two contributors.
We also analyze how equilibrium public goods provision changes as the economy becomes
large. Following Milleron's (1972) notion of replicating a public goods economy, we prove
that the equilibrium public goods provision level converges to zero as the economy grows
(Theorem 3).2
This paper is organized as follows. The next two subsections brie
y discuss some related
literature. Section 2 sets out our public goods provision game, and introduces the FRP-Core
as a solution concept. We also provide a simple characterization of the FRP-Core (Theorem
1), which indicates that the FRP-Core is a natural solution concept for the public goods
provision problem with voluntary participation. In Section 3, we provide a noncooperative
voluntary participation game, and propose PCPNE as an equilibrium concept. In Section
4, we prove the equivalence between PCPNE and the FRP-Core (Theorem 2). In Section
5, we provide an example to reveal some interesting properties of the FRP-Core. Section
6 considers a replica economy and shows that the public goods provision level shrinks to
zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way (Theorem 3). In Section 7, we conclude
with a discussion on the robustness of our results to the utility specication. In particular,
we argue that all the results would be preserved with some additional mild assumptions
even if we adopt Gorman-form utilities (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983) instead of quasi-linear
2Muench (1972), Milleron (1972) and Conley (1994) discuss the diculty of replicating a public goods
economy and oer various possible methods. Milleron's notion of replication is to split endowments with
replicates and adjust preferences so that agents' concerns for the private good are relative to the size of their
endowments. This notion is employed by Healy (2007).
4utilities. Then, the Appendix A provides useful properties of the core of convex games
and an algorithm that nds a core allocation starting with an arbitrary utility vector. The
Appendix B collects proofs of our results. The Appendix C examines some other equilibrium
concepts and extensive-form games to be compared with the PCPNE of our extensive-form
game (or the FRP-Core).
1.1 Related Literature in Theory of Coalition Formation
Since the public good in our problem is pure so that outsiders can enjoy the benets from
public goods provision, our problem belongs to the class of coalition formation problem with
spillovers (externalities). The literature on this subject is very large (see Bloch 1997, and
Ray 2007 for overviews); here we only discuss most related papers to ours.
CPNE has been adopted as an equilibrium concept in the theory of coalition formation.
Thoron (1998) examines the formation of a single cartel and shows that the coalition-proof
stable cartel is uniquely determined adopting the CPNE as a solution concept. Yi and Shin
(2000) investigate research joint venture allowing multiple R&D cartels to form; they examine
the existence of a CPNE and its properties. In these papers, credible coalitional deviations
are considered only in the stage of players' decisions as to whether or not they participate
in a coalition. In the extensive-form game of this paper, we require both participation and
contribution decisions of players to be immune to credible coalitional deviations. To our
knowledge, this paper is the rst to use PCPNE as a solution concept of coalition formation
problem, which endogenously determines the coalition formation and the allocation of payos
within the coalition.
The literature also includes studies on the coalition formation regarding the public goods
provision. Assuming identical players and nontransferable payos, Bloch (1997) provides a
complete comparison of the equilibrium coalition structures, employing various solution con-
cepts and game forms. Also assuming identical players, Ray and Vohra (2001) characterize
the equilibrium coalition structure and payo allocations for a standard sequential coalitional
bargaining game of public goods provision. These authors allow multiple coalitions to form
5for public goods provision. In contrast, we assume that there is only one coalition to form
and its members are the only ones who provide a public good.3 But, we allow players to be
heterogeneous, and more importantly provide a simple characterization of the set of PCPNE
allocations utilizing its equivalence with the FRP-Core.
Last but not least, there is the literature on noncooperative coalition bargaining games
that discusses the relationship between the equilibrium outcome(s) in the limit cases and
the core. Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta (1993) show that the Markov equilibrium
outcome is a subsolution of the core (in convex TU games). Perry and Reny (1994) and
Moldovanu and Winter (1995) provide coalitional bargaining games that implement the
core.4 The latter two papers are particularly related to our paper, since the set of outcomes
of CPNE is equivalent to the core in our common agency game.5 In the Appendix C, we
compare the set of PCPNEs of our game with equilibrium outcomes of these noncooperative
bargaining games preceded by a voluntary participation game.
1.2 Related Literature on Voluntary Participation Mechanisms in
Public Goods Economy
It is well known that public goods provision is subject to free-riding incentives. Although
Samuelson's (1954) view of this problem was pessimistic, Groves and Ledyard (1977) show
that ecient public goods provision can be achieved in Nash equilibrium if individual ra-
tionality is not required. Then, Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) show that the Lindahl
mechanism is implementable. Subsequently, numerous mechanisms have been proposed to
improve the properties of mechanisms. They all assume, however, that players have no free-
dom to make participation decisions about the mechanism, i.e., players' participation to the
mechanism is always assumed.
3With our second-stage common agency game, this dierence turns out to be unimportant. Even if
multiple coalitions are formed, equilibrium public goods provision level will be the same as the case of
the union of them is the contribution group. We need to assume, however, that non-participants cannot
contribute in the second stage.
4We thank a referee for bringing our attention to this literature.
5Laussel and Le Breton (2001) show that the set of CPNE outcomes is equivalent to the core when the
underlying TU game of a common agency game is convex. Convexity of TU game is satised in the common
agency game in a public good provision problem.
6Introducing outside opportunities by a \reversion function" (such that each outcome
is mapped to another outcome in case of no participation), Jackson and Palfrey (2001)
analyze the implementation problem when players' participation in a mechanism is voluntary.
Although their reversion function is very general, it assigns the same outcome no matter
who deviates from the original outcome. Thus, the method may not be suitable for a
public goods provision problem in which dierent players' deviations from participation may
generate dierent outcomes. Taking this consideration into account, Healy (2007) analyzes
the implementation problem in a public goods economy demanding all players' participation
in equilibrium (i.e., equilibrium participation). He shows that as the economy is replicated in
Milleron's (1972) sense, the set of equilibrium allocations of any mechanism that satises the
equilibrium participation condition converges to the endowment. Although the equilibrium
public goods provision level converges to zero as the economy is replicated also in our model,
we allow players not to participate in the contribution group in equilibrium, and it is indeed
the source of under-provision of the public good unlike Healy's (2007).
Closest to our noncooperative framework is the one by Saijo and Yamato (1999), who
are the rst to consider a two-stage voluntary participation game of a public goods economy,
without requiring all players' participation in equilibrium.6 They show a negative result on
eciency of public goods provision, and then characterize subgame perfect equilibria in the
case of symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility. In contrast, we show that the set of PCPNE of a
common agency game with a participation decision is equivalent to our FRP-Core, allowing
heterogeneous players that have quasi-linear utility functions.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show that in a binary public goods provision game where
symmetric players voluntarily make participation decisions, all pure-strategy Nash equilibria
are ecient (if contributions are not refundable in case of no provision). With asymmetric
players, there are many Nash equilibria with dierent levels of cooperation. Shinohara (2009)
6In the eld of international trade, Bombardini (2008) and Paltseva (2006) extend Grossman and Help-
man's (1994) menu-auction political-economy model to incorporate rms' voluntary participation in lobbies;
they consider the cases in which rms in oligopolistic, import-competing industries make participation de-
cisions. Unlike our noncooperative game framework, Bombardini (2008) only considers the most ecient
contribution group, while Paltseva (2006) assumes that rms are symmetric and derives subgame perfect
equilibrium as opposed to PCPNE.
7examines a public goods provision problem with decreasing marginal benets, and shows in
the case of homogeneous players that it becomes harder to support ecient allocations as
the ecient level of the public good rises and hence the number of participants needed to
provide the public good increases. Our Theorem 3 has some similarity to this result.
2 The Model
This section sets out the contribution game in which all players' interests accord with each
other, although the intensity of their interests can be heterogeneous. We rst describe the
problem of our interest, and then propose the FRP-Core as an appealing solution of the
problem.
2.1 Public Goods Provision Problem
A stylized public goods model is dened as follows. There is a public good whose provision
level is denoted by a 2 A = R+.7 Provision cost function C : A ! R+ is continuous
and strictly increasing with C(0) = 0. The government provides the public good, and its
cost is regarded as the government's disutility from the provision; the government's utility
from providing a units of the public good is vG(a) =  C(a). Player i's utility function is
quasi-linear such that her utility from the consumption of the public good is vi(a) and the
net consumption x of the private goods enter the function linearly, i.e., vi(a) + x, where
vi : A ! R+ is strictly increasing with vi(0) = 0. In order to guarantee the existence of a
non-trivial solution, we assume that (i) there exists ~ a 2 A such that vi(~ a) C(~ a) > 0 for all
i 2 N, where N is the set of n players, and (ii) there is ^ a 2 A such that
P
i2N vi(a) C(a) < 0
for all a > ^ a. The only new element to this standard public goods provision game is that
every player has a choice as to whether or not to participate in the contribution group. The
contribution group, therefore, may be a proper subset of all players.
7For our equivalence results (Theorems 1 and 2), we only need comonotonic preferences over an abstract
agenda set A. The extension is straightforward. We focus on the one-dimensional public goods economy
just for simplicity.
82.2 Free-Riding-Proof Core
We rst dene an intuitive hybrid solution concept, free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core). In
short, the FRP-Core is the Pareto-optimal set of the Foley-core allocations of all contribution
groups that are immune to free-riding incentives. The FRP-Core will be shown to be always
nonempty in the public goods provision problem.
Our interests in the public goods provision problem are twofold: (i) which group provides
how much of the public goods, and (ii) how the benets and costs of the public good are
shared by the group members. For S  N with S 6= ;, we dene























i2S vi(a) C(a), and uj = vj(a)
for all j = 2 S. An ecient allocation for S is an allocation (S;a;u) such that
P
i2S ui = V (S)
with a 2 a(S). (Henceforth, we assume that a(S) is a singleton just for simplicity.) Note
that NnS are passive free-riders, and they do not contribute at all. Let X(S) be the collection
of all ecient allocations for S. A free-riding-proof ecient allocation for S is an ecient
allocation for S, (S;a(S);u) 2 X(S) such that
ui  vi(a
(Snfig)) for any i 2 S:
That is, under a free-riding-proof ecient allocation, no player in S has an incentive to opt
out of the contribution group while enjoying the public good provided by the remaining
players in S. Let XFRP(S) be the set of all free-riding-proof ecient allocations for S. It
should be emphasized that XFRP(S) can be empty when S is a large set; with a large number
of members, it becomes harder to satisfy free-riding-proofness.
Given that S is the contribution group, a natural way to allocate utility among the
members is to use the core (Foley, 1970).8 Focusing on coalition S and its subsets, we write
8The Foley core is the standard core concept of a public good economy. In the denition of the Foley core,
9Core(S) =

(S;a(S);u) 2 X(S) :
P
i2T ui  V (T); 8T  S
	
, the set of all core allocations
for S, which is immune to all subcoalitions' group deviations. Obviously, a core allocation
for S may not be immune to free-riding incentives for the members of S. Thus, we dene the
FRP-core allocation for S by CoreFRP(S) = Core(S) \ XFRP(S). An FRP-Core allocation
for S is a core allocation for S that is immune to unilateral free-riding deviations, and
CoreFRP(S) is the set of all FRP-Core allocations for S.9 The set CoreFRP(S) is a collection
of internally stable allocations for S in the sense that no subgroup of S has an incentive to
deviate to form an alternative contribution group, and no player in S has an incentive to
free-ride. Similarly to XFRP(S), CoreFRP(S) may be empty for a large group S, but it is
nonempty for small groups (for singleton groups in particular).
Now, we consider allocations that are \fully" stable against any coalitional blocking.
A coalition T (weakly) blocks an allocation (S;a(S);u) via an allocation (T;a(T);u0), if
and only if (i) u0
i  ui for all i 2 T and u0
j > uj for at least one member j 2 T, (ii)
P
i2T u0
i = V (T), and (iii)
P
i2T0 u0
i  V (T 0) for all T 0  T.10 The solution concept free-
riding-proof core (FRP-Core) is a collection of all FRP-Core allocations for all S, which are















The FRP-Core is a collection of internally stable allocations for some coalition that are not
blocked by any other coalition with an internally stable allocation; we impose a credibility
when a subset of the contribution group decides to deviate from an allocation, the original agreement on the
level of public good provision and its cost-sharing are totally abandoned and the public good is provided
solely by the deviating coalition. Others, including the members (if any) of the original contribution group
in question who are not in the deviating coalition, are still able to enjoy the public good. In the Foley notion
of the core, what is important is to see whether or not members of a blocking coalition would be better o
by the deviation, while well-being of other players is not the issue.
9The FRP-core allocations would not be aected even if we allow free-riding deviations by multiple
players in our public goods provision game. If an ecient allocation is immune to any unilateral free-riding
deviation, it is also immune to any free-riding deviations by multiple players, since the reduction of the
public good would become larger if more players free-ride so that every player prefers free-riding by herself
if she free-rides at all.
10We use \weak" blocking and weak Pareto-domination in this paper, partly because it would give us
clearer result in the noncooperative game we consider in the next section.
10constraint for legitimate coalitional deviations, regarding non-internally-stable coalitional
deviations as non-credible because there would be further deviations from such deviations.
The above hybrid solution concept is natural and appealing, but it might not appear to
be easy to work with when applied to specic problems. For example, it is not immediately
clear if FRP-Core is nonempty. The following proposition provides a useful property of the
core for subsets of N.
Proposition 1. If a core allocation for T, (T;a(T);u0) 2 Core(T), blocks (S;a(S);u) 2
Core(S), then a(S) < a(T) and (T;a(T);u0) 2 Core(T) (weakly) Pareto-dominates
(S;a(S);u) 2 Core(S).
Proposition 1 claims that if a core allocation for T is preferred to a core allocation for S by
all members of T, then the former allocation Pareto-dominates the latter in our pure public
good economy. This proposition simplies the characterization of the FRP-Core, allowing




, for an arbitrary set of allocations 
, denotes the Pareto frontier of 
 (i.e., an
allocation (S;a;u) is in a set 
 if and only if there is no allocation (T;a0;u0) 2 
 such that
u0  u with u0
i > ui for some i 2 N). This property assures that CoreFRP is nonempty.
Proposition 2. CoreFRP = [S022NCoreFRP(S0) 6= ;.
We can also characterize CoreFRP, using the standard core concept on a restricted allo-
cation set. Take the union of all free-riding-proof ecient allocations for S over all S  N

















i  ui for all i 2 T, and u
0
j > uj for some j 2 T
	
:
We have the following theorem.





Two remarks follow. First, for the standard transferable utility (TU) and non-transferable
utility (NTU) characteristic-function-form game, Ray (1989) denes credible coalitions re-
cursively on nested coalitions and denes the credible core; he shows that the core and the
credible core are equivalent. Despite the fact that our game has externalities due to spillovers
of the public good and the grand coalition usually does not support the FRP-Core, his ar-
gument extends to our case such that the credible core of XFRP coincides with CoreFRP.
Second, we impose eciency on the allocations in the denition of XFRP only for simplicity.
We can easily allow inecient allocations in the denition of feasible allocations by using
~ XFRP(S) = f(S;a(S);u) :
P
i2S ui  V (S), and ui  vi(a(Snfig)) for all i 2 Sg and let-
ting ~ XFRP = [SN ~ XFRP(S). However, we would still require each contribution group S to
provide the public good at the ecient level, i.e., a(S) = a(S). We need to assign a public
goods provision level to every S  N in order to dene the free-riding-proof allocations;
the ecient public goods provision level a(S) is a natural candidate to be assigned to each
group S.
3 A Voluntary Participation Game
We discuss the endogenous contribution-group formation and its consequences on the public
goods provision. We rst dene the extensive-form, public-good contribution game with
voluntary participation; the rst stage is a group formation game followed by the second-
stage common agency game played by group S that has been formed in the rst stage.
For this extensive-form game, we do not only require the common agency stage of public
goods provision to be coalition-proof but require the contribution-group formation itself to be
coalition-proof. As an extension of CPNE for strategic-form games to the one for extensive-
form games, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) dene the perfectly coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (PCPNE) as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for multi-stage games.
The rst-stage group-formation game is such that each player i 2 N chooses her action
from the set 1
i = f0;1g, where 0 and 1 represent non-participation and participation,
12respectively, i.e., player i announces her participation decision. Once action prole 1 =
(1
1;:::;1
n) 2 1 = j2N1
j is selected, then the contribution game takes place in the second
stage with the set of active players S(1) = fi 2 N : 1
i = 1g. Since the agent's (the
government's) choice in the third stage is a mechanical decision problem, we incorporate
this stage in the second-stage contribution game (following Bernheim and Whinston, 1986).
The second-stage game is a common agency game played by participating principals
S(1), as analyzed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The set NnS(1) is the set of passive
free-riders. Each player i 2 S(1) simultaneously oers a contribution schedule i : A ! R+.
Given the prole of contribution schedules S(1) = (i(a))i2S(1), the government G (the









where the rst term on the right-hand side of the last equation is the total contribution and
the second term is the cost of public goods provision. If the government chooses a 2 A, then
player i obtains her payo
ui(a;i(a)) = vi(a)   i(a);
for i 2 S(1), and
ui(a) = vi(a);





with a slight abuse of notation. Let T be the set of all contribution schedules i : A ! R+.
Player i's second-stage strategy 2
i is a mapping 2
i : 2Nnf;g ! T : i.e., a contribution
schedule is assigned to each subgame. Note that in subgame S 2 2Nnf;g where i = 2 S,
2
i(S) : A ! R+ is irrelevant to the outcome. Nevertheless, we include non-participant's
second-stage strategies for notational simplicity. The set of player i's second-stage strategies
is denoted by 2
i.
133.1 Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium for the Contribution-
Group Participation Game
Following Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), we dene PCPNE for our two-stage game.
Let   i2Ni. Player i's strategy is i = (1
i;2
i) 2 i = 1
i 2
i and her payo function
is ui :  ! R as described in the above.
For T  N, we consider a reduced game  (T; T) in which only players in T are active
while players in N nT are passive such that they always choose  T. We also consider proper
subgames for every 1 2 1, and reduced subgames  (T;1;2
 T) in a similar way. A perfectly
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) (;a)  ((1
i ;2
i )i2N;a) is dened recursively
as follows.
Denition. (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987)
(i) In a single-player, single-stage subgame  (fig;1;2
 fig), strategy 2
i (S(1)) 2 T and
agenda a chosen by the agent is PCPNE if 2
i maximizes ui through the choice of a.
(ii) Let (n;t) be the pair of the number of players and the number of stages of the reduced
(sub-)game, where t 2 f1;2g. Let (n;t) 6= (1;1). Assume that PCPNE has been
dened for all games with m players and r stages, where (m;r)  (n;t) with (m;r) 6=
(n;t).
(a) For any game   with n players and t stages, (;a) 2   A is perfectly self-
enforcing, if for all proper subset T of the n players, (
T;a) is PCPNE in the
reduced game  (T;
 T), and if the restriction of  to any proper subgame forms
a (P)CPNE in that subgame,
and
(b) for any game   with n players and t stages, (;a) is a PCPNE if it is perfectly
self-enforcing, and if there does not exist another perfectly self-enforcing pair
14(;a) 2   A such that ui (a;i)  ui (a
i) for all i = 1;:::;n with at least one
strict inequality.11
For any T  N and any strategy prole ; let PCPNE( (T; T)) denote the set of
PCPNE strategy proles for T in the reduced game  (T; T). A strategic coalitional devi-
ation (T;0
T;a0) from any strategy prole (;a) is credible if (0
T;a0) 2 PCPNE( (T; T)).
A PCPNE is a strategy prole that is immune to any credible coalitional deviation. An
outcome allocation for (;a) is a list (S(1);a;u;uG) 2 2N ARN R, where (u;uG)
is the resulting utility allocation for players and the government.
There are two remarks to be made on PCPNE.
First, if a coalition T wants to deviate in the rst stage, it can orchestrate the whole plan
of the deviation by assigning a new CPNE to each subgame so that the target allocation (by
the deviation) would be attained as a PCPNE of the reduced game  (T; T).
Second, the denition of PCPNE coincides with the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
(CPNE) in the (static) second stage. Thus, a CPNE needs to be assigned to each subgame.
There are useful characterizations of CPNE of a common agency game in the literature. The
rst characterization is provided by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Consider a subgame
S, and denote player i's strategy in this subgame 2
i(S) : A ! R+ by i : A ! R+. They
introduce a concept, called truthful strategies, where i is truthful relative to  a if and only
if for all a 2 A either vi(a)   i(a) = vi( a)   i( a), or vi(a)   i(a) < vi( a)   i( a) with
i(a) = 0. A truthful Nash equilibrium (
S;a) is a Nash equilibrium such that 
i is truthful
relative to a 2 A for all i 2 S. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that (i) every truthful
Nash equilibrium is a CPNE, and (ii) the set of truthful equilibria and that of CPNE in
the utility space are equivalent, and provide a useful characterization of CPNE in the utility
space. Laussel and Le Breton (2001) further analyze CPNE in utility space. One of their
results provides a nice characterization of CPNE when payo functions satisfy a special (yet
11Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) dene the PCPNE based on strictly improving coalitional devi-
ations. We adopt, however, a denition based on weakly improving coalitional deviations, since the theorem
on menu auction in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), to which we appeal, uses CPNE based on weakly
improving deviation. For details on these two denitions, see Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
15useful) property, comonotonic payo property: ui(a)  ui(a0) if and only if uj(a)  uj(a0)
for all i;j 2 S and all a;a0 2 A. Obviously, this property is satised in our public goods
provision problem.
Fact. (Laussel and Le Breton, 2001) Consider a common agency problem   = (S;A;(T ;vi)i2S;C)
played by the set S of the principals and the agent G with a comonotonic payo property.
Then, in all CPNEs of the common agency game, agent G obtains uG = maxa2A[ C(a)] (no
rent property), and the set of CPNE in utility space is equivalent to the core of the character-
istic function game (~ V (T))TS, where ~ V (T) = V (T)   uG = maxa2A
 P




In the public goods provision problem, uG =  C(0) = 0, thus ~ V (T) = V (T) for all
T  S. A payo vector uS = (ui)i2S is in the core if and only if
P
i2S ui = V (S) and
P
i2T ui  V (T) for all T  S.
4 The Main Result
This section shows our main result that the set of FRP-core allocations coincides with the
set of PCPNE outcomes of the voluntary participation game. In the public goods provision
problem, the above Fact (Laussel and Le Breton, 2001) implies that the second-stage CPNE
outcomes coincide with the set of all core allocations of a characteristic function form game
for S with (V (T))TS where V (T) = maxa2A
 P
i2T vi(a)   C(a)

.12 This is nothing but
Foley's (1970) core in a public goods economy for S. This observation gives us some insight
for our two-stage noncooperative game. First, for each subgame played by S0 = S(10), the
utility outcome uS0 must be in the core of (V (T))TS0. Second, given the setup of our group-
formation game in the rst stage, if a CPNE outcome u in a subgame S can be realized as the
equilibrium outcome (on the equilibrium path), it is necessary that u 2 CoreFRP(S), since
otherwise some member of S would deviate in the rst stage obtaining a secured free-riding
12Indeed, CPNE and strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) with weakly improving deviations are
equivalent in a common agency game with the no-rent property. See Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
16payo. This observation is useful in our analysis of the equivalence theorem. With a careful
construction of equilibrium strategies, we can show the following.
Proposition 3. If an allocation (S;a(S);u) is in the FRP-Core, then there is a PCPNE 
whose outcome is (S;a(S);u).
We relegate a proof of Proposition 3 to the Appendix B (with some preliminary analyses
in the Appendix A). Here, we brie
y describe how to construct PCPNE .
First, in dening , we need to assign a CPNE utility prole to every subgame that
corresponds to a coalition S  N. Since the second-stage strategy prole is described by
utility allocations assigned to each subgame, we partition the set of subgames (expressed in
terms of active players) S = fS 2 2N : S 6= ;g into three categories: (i) S1 = fSg on the
equilibrium path, which is the contribution group formed in equilibrium, (ii) S2 = fS 2 S :
S \ S = ;g, and (iii) S3 = fS 2 SnS1 : S \ S 6= ;g. As Laussel and Le Breton (2001)
show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S0 corresponds to a core allocation for S0. To support
the equilibrium path (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP by a PCPNE, we need to show that there
is no credible deviation in the rst stage. This requires careful and nontrivial assignment of
a core allocation to every single subgame.
We prove Proposition 3 by contradiction. Consider a deviation from S by a coalition T,
which leads to the formation of a new contribution group S0. As Figure 1 shows, T consists of
players who change their rst-stage actions ((i) and (ii) in the gure) and players who change
their second-stage actions ((iv) in the gure). Suppose to the contrary that this deviation is
credible. Then, for all members of T, both protability of deviation and free-riding-proofness
must be satised. Thus, for every player i 2 T, the post-deviation payo u0
i must satisfy u0
i 
 ui = maxfu
i;vi(S0nfig)g, where u
i denotes player i's payo in the prescribed equilibrium.
The case where S0\S 6= ; as depicted in Figure 1 is most subtle. We show that even in such
cases, if there were such a credible deviation, there would exist an allocation (S0;a(S0);u0) 2
CoreFRP(S0) that Pareto-dominates (S;a(S);u). By the characterization in Proposition
2, however, this contradicts the supposition that (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP. We show
Pareto-domination by using the fact that the utility allocation assigned to subgame S0 under
17 is a core allocation, and construct the core allocation by the algorithm that is provided in
Appendix A.
Once this direction of the relationship between the FRP-Core and PCPNE is estab-
lished, the converse is trivial. The PCPNE requires free-riding-proofness, so every PCPNE
must be an FRP-Core allocation for some S. Since CoreFRP is the Pareto-frontier of
[SNCoreFRP(S), Proposition 3 indeed implies that any Pareto-dominated FRP-Core allo-
cation for S can be defeated by an FRP-Core allocation, which is supported by a PCPNE.
Theorem 2. An allocation (S;a(S);u) is in the FRP-Core if and only if there is a PCPNE
 whose outcome is (S;a(S);u).
Proof. We prove the converse of the relationship described in Proposition 3, i.e., we show
that every PCPNE  generates an FRP-Core allocation as its outcome. It is easy to see
that the outcome (S;a(S);u) of a PCPNE  is a FRP-Core allocation (and not just a core
allocation) for S, since otherwise a player would have an incentive to free-ride in the rst
stage of the extensive-form game and hence the resulting allocation will not be a PCPNE.
Thus, (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP(S). Now, suppose that u = 2 CoreFRP. Then, there is an
FRP-Core allocation (S0;a(S0);u0) 2 CoreFRP with u0 > u. Proposition 3 further implies
that a deviation by the grand coalition N that induces (S0;a(S0);u0) can attain u0 with a
PCPNE 0. This means that there is a credible coalitional deviation from , which leads to
a contradiction. Thus, every PCPNE achieves an FRP-Core allocation. 
This result crucially depends on the \comonotonicity of preferences" (Laussel and Le
Breton, 2003), and perfectly nonexcludable public goods (free-riders can fully enjoy public
goods). Without these assumptions, the above equivalence does not hold in general.
Although the FRP-Core is much easier to grasp than PCPNE, it may still not be clear
how the FRP-Core looks like. A simple example in the next section illustrates the properties
of FRP-Core allocations and thus the outcomes of PCPNE of our voluntary contribution
game.
185 An Example: Linear Utility and Quadratic Cost
Let vi(a) = ia for any i 2 N and C(a) = a2=2, where i > 0 is a preference parameter.
Here in this section, we identify players by their preference parameters, i.e., i = i for any
i 2 N. Then, the optimal level of the public good for group S is determined by the rst-order
condition
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Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let N = f11;5;3;1g, where i = i for each i 2 N.
First we check if the grand coalition S = N is supportable. When S = N, we have
a(N) =
P
i2N i = 20, and V (N) = 202=2 = 200. For the allocation to be free-riding-proof,
each player must obtain the following payo at the very least:
v11(a
(Nnf11g)) = (20   11)  11 = 99;
v5(a
(Nnf5g)) = (20   5)  5 = 75;
v3(a
(Nnf3g)) = (20   3)  3 = 51;
v1(a
(Nnf1g)) = (20   1)  1 = 19:
The sum of all these values exceeds the value of the grand coalition V (N). As a result, we
can conclude CoreFRP(N) = ;.
19 The FRP-Core for the grand coalition N may be empty. Thus, the FRP-Core may be
suboptimal.
Next, consider S = f11;5g. Then, a(S) = 16, and V (S) = 128. In order to check if the
FRP-Core for S is nonempty, we rst check again the free-riding incentives.
v(a
(Snf11g)) = (16   11)  11 = 55;
v(a
(Snf5g)) = (16   5)  5 = 55:
Thus, if there is a FRP-Core allocation for S, u = (u11;u5) must satisfy











where the last two conditions follow from the core requirement. That is, we have13
Core(f11;5g)
= fu 2 R
5




= fu 2 R
5
+ : u11 + u5 = 128; u11  60:5; u5  55;u3 = 48; u2 = 32; u1 = 16g:
It is readily seen that CoreFRP(f11;5g) 6= ;, but it is a smaller set than Core(f11;5g).
 Free-riding-proof constraints may narrow the set of attainable core allocations for a
coalition.
13For notational simplicity, we abuse notations by dropping irrelevant arguments of allocations. Thus, in
this subsection, allocations are simply expressed by utility allocations.
20Note that in this case, only the free-riding incentive constraint for player 5 is binding. It is
better for player 11 to provide public goods alone than free-riding on player 5. 
Now, let us analyze the FRP-Core. Since the FRP-Core requires Pareto-eciency on the
union of FRP-Cores over all subsets S of the players, we rst need to nd the FRP-Core for
each S. In general, even a minimal task of checking the nonemptiness of the FRP-Core for
S is cumbersome, since the FRP-Core for S demands two almost unrelated requirements:
immunity to coalitional deviation attempts and to free-riding incentives. However, it is easy
to narrow down the candidates by using a necessary condition for the nonemptiness of the
FRP-Core for S.
Observation. In the case of linear utility and quadratic cost, if the FRP-Core for S is
nonempty, then S satises the following aggregate \no free-riding condition."

































The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
By utilizing this proposition, we can characterize the FRP-Core of the public goods
economy in Example 1.
Example 1. (Continued) The FRP-Core allocations are attained by groups f11;5;1g,
f11;3;1g, f11;5g, f11;3g, and f5;3g.
First, by applying Observation, we nd that there are 12 contribution groups that satisfy
the necessary condition for the nonempty FRP-Core for S: f11;5;1g; f11;3;1g, f11;5g,
f11;3g, f11;1g, f5;3g, f5;1g, f3;1g, f11g, f5g, f3g, and f1g.
21The FRP-Core for S = f11;5;3g is empty, for example. For S = f11;5;3g, we have
a(S) = 19 and V (S) = 180:5. Since 11v(a(Snf11g)) = 88, 5v(a(Snf5g) = 70, 3v(a(Snf3g)) =
48, and 88 + 70 + 48 > 180:5, the necessary condition for S = f11;5;3g to give a FRP-Core
allocation is violated. As we will see, however, CoreFRP(f11;5;1g) is not empty. Thus
f11;5;1g is the group that achieves the highest level of public good while having a nonempty
FRP-Core. This analysis provides an interesting observation.
 (Even the largest) group that achieves a FRP-Core allocation may not be consecutive.14
The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose (S) is positive (say, S = f11;5g).
Now, we try to nd S0  S that still satises (S0)  0. If the value of (S) is positive and
yet not too large, then adding a player with a high  (say, player 3) may make (S0) < 0, since
adding such a player may greatly increase a(S0), making the free-riding problem severer.
On the contrary, adding a player with a low  (say, player 1) does not make the free-rider
problem too severe, so (S0)  0 may be satised relatively easily.
Among the above 12 groups, it is easy to see that groups f5;1g, f3;1g, f11g, f5g, f3g,
and f1g do not survive the test of Pareto-domination. For example, consider S0 = f11;5g
and u0 = (73;55;48;16) 2 CoreFRP(f11;5g). This is the best allocation for player 11 in
CoreFRP(f11;5g) as the characterization of CoreFRP(f11;5g) in the above indicates. Players
other than 11 and 5 are free-riders, and their payos are directly generated from a(f11;5g) =
16. Now it is straightforward to see that the allocation u0 dominates all allocations for the
above six groups; public goods provision levels of those groups are insucient compared with
a(f11;5g) = 16.
On the contrary, f5;3g is not dominated by any FRP-Core allocations for any contribu-
tion group. We can show that player 11 can obtain at most 73 in a FRP-Core allocation for
any S 3 11, whereas she obtains 88 by free-riding on f5;3g. Thus, player 11 would not join
a deviation. Without player 11's cooperation, no free-riding core allocation that dominates
those of f5;3g can be realized.
14Although the context and approach are very dierent from ours, the formation of such non-consecutive
coalitions has attracted tremendous interests in the elds of political science and sociology,. For a game-
theoretical treatment of this line of literature (known and \Gamson's law"), see Le Breton, et al. (2008).
22Similarly, FRP-Core allocations for S = f11;1g are dominated by the one for S0 = f11;5g.
Under S = f11;1g, player 5 obtains 60, but S0 can attain u0 = (63;65;48;16). Free-riding-
proof core allocations for f11;3;1g and f11;3g cannot be beaten, however, by the ones for
S0 = f11;5g; player 5, for example, gets 70 even under f11;3g while she would obtain at
most 67.5 under S0 = f11;5g as we can see from CoreFRP(f11;5g) derived in the above.
Finally, consider S = f11;5g, f11;3g. The FRP-Core allocations for S = f11;5g are
characterized by u11 + u5 = 128, u11  60:5 and u5  55, with u3 = 48 and u1 = 16.




1 = 144:5, u0
11 + u0
5  128, u0
11  66, u0
5  60, and u0




1  18 and u0
11 + u0
1  72 are satised because u0
11  66, u0
5  60, and u0
1  16.)
Here, S0 can attain u0
11 + u0
5 = 144:5   16 = 128:5 as long as u0
11  66 and u0
5  60. Thus, if
u 2 CoreFRP(f11;5g) satises u11+u5 = 128, 60:5  u11  68:5, and 55  u5  62:5, then u
is improved upon by an allocation in CoreFRP(f11;5;1g). However, if u 2 CoreFRP(f11;5g)
satises u11 + u5 = 128, u11 > 68:5, or u5 > 62:5, then u cannot be improved upon by
group f11;5;1g. The FRP-Core allocations for S = f11;3g have a similar property with
possible deviations by group S0 = f11;3;1g. This phenomenon illustrates another interesting
observation:
 An expansion of a group denitely increases the total value of the group, while it gives
less 
exibility in allocating the benets among the group members since free-riding
incentives increase as the level of the public goods provision rises. As a result, some
unequal FRP-Core allocations for the original group may not be improved upon by the
group expansion.
In summary, the FRP-Core is the union of the following sets of allocations attained by
the ve dierent groups.
1. S = f11;5;1g; a(S) = 17 and all FRP-Core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP(f11;5;1g)
= fu 2 R
5
+ : u11 + u5 + u1 = 144:5; u3 = 51; u11  66; u5  60; u1  16:g
232. S = f11;3;1g; a(S) = 15 and all FRP-Core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP(f11;3;1g)
= fu 2 R
5
+ : u11 + u3 + u1 = 112:5; u5 = 75;u11  60:5; u3  36; u1  14g:
3. S = f11;5g; a(S) = 16 and only a subset of FRP-Core allocations for S is included:

u 2 Core
FRP(f11;5g) : u11 > 68:5 or u5 > 62:5
	
= fu 2 R
5
+ : u11 + u5 = 128; u3 = 48; u1 = 16;68:5 < u11  73 or 62:5 < u5  67:5g
4. S = f11;3g; a(S) = 14 and only a subset of FRP-Core allocations for S is included:

u 2 Core
FRP(f11;3g) : u11 > 62:5
	
= fu 2 R
5
+ : u11 + u3 = 98; u5 = 70; u1 = 14;62:5 < u11  65g
5. S = f5;3g; a(S) = 8 and all FRP-Core allocations for S are included:
Core
FRP(f5;3g)
= fu 2 R
5
+ : u5 + u3 = 32; u11 = 88; u1 = 8;u5  15; u3  15g

Before closing this section, we compare the FRP-Core allocations with a Nash equilibrium
of a simultaneous-move voluntary public goods provision game studied by Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian (1986). Each player i chooses her monetary contribution mi  0 to nance a






the cost function of public goods production C(a) = a2=2. Consider player i. Given that
others contribute M i in total, player i chooses mi so as to maximize i
p
2(mi + M i) mi.
The best response for player i is m
i = maxf(2
i=2)   M i;0g. It is easy to see that in our
example, only player 11 contributes, so the public goods provision level is 11.15 Thus, by
15Contribution is made only by the highest willingness-to-pay player. This observation is true for all
quasi-linear utility players (with no income eect).
24forming a contribution group in the rst stage, it is possible to increase the equilibrium level
of the public goods provision. But it is also possible that the level of public goods provision is
lower than the Nash equilibrium provision level of the standard voluntary contribution game,
as we have found that group f5;3g achieves some FRP-Core allocations in our example.
 There may be FRP-Core allocations that achieve lower public goods provision levels
than the Nash equilibrium outcome of a simple voluntary contribution game studied by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).
This occurs because in our setup, player 11 can commit to being an outsider in the rst
stage, which cannot happen in a simultaneous-move voluntary contribution game. Finally,
needless to say, we have:
 The FRP-Core may be a highly nonconvex set as dierent allocations may be realized
by dierent contribution groups.
6 Replicated Economies
In this section, we analyze whether or not public goods provision and the participation rate
decrease as the economy is replicated.
There is a tricky issue in replicating a (pure) public goods economy. If the set of con-
sumers is simply replicated, the amount of resources in the economy grows to innity, while
maintaining the same cost function for public good production. Following Milleron's (1972)
method, Healy (2007) makes each consumer's endowment shrink proportionally to the pop-
ulation as the economy is replicated to overcome this problem; consumers' preferences are
also modied in the replication process.16 We adopt the same preference modication in the
replication of a quasi-linear economy. We shrink each consumer's willingness-to-pay propor-
tionally as the economy is replicated. This way of replication is natural for a quasi-linear
economy, since the aggregate willingness-to-pay and cost functions stay the same in the
replication process.
16Conley (1994) uses a dierent denition of replicated economy, and investigates the convergence of the
core.
25The original economy is a list E = (N;(vi)i2N;C). Let r = 1;2;3;::: be a natural number.
The rth replica of E is a list Er = (Nr;(vr




rvi(a) for all q = 1;::;r.17 Let a characteristic function form game generated
from Er be V r.
We analyze FRP-Core allocations (S;a(S);u) of the characteristic function form game
V r by focusing on the free-riding-proofness condition. Note that for any r, and for any
S  Nr, the public goods provision level a = a(S) is determined so that the sum of













C(a(S)) in order to satisfy the free-riding-proofness, where the terms in the parentheses on
the left-hand side indicate how much each player can pay without sacricing the free-riding-
proofness. Let mi(S) 2 f0;;rg denote the number of type i players in S. Then, the above











where it should be understood that S n fiqg denote the set of all players but one player of









Now, consider the kth replication, where k = 1;2;, of this rth replica of the original
economy, which implies that each player in the rth replica of the original economy is divided
into k players. Let Sk be a coalition in this k  rth replica economy that contains all k
replica players of all members of S in rth replica economy. Obviously, a(S) in rth replica
economy equals a(Sk) in krth replica economy. However, although the coecients satisfy
mi(S)=r = mi(Sk)=(kr), a(Sknfig) converges to a(Sk) = a(S) as k goes to innity. Thus,
the krth replica economy's counterpart of inequality (1) would be violated at some point.
Formally, we have the following result.
17Let x and a denote the consumption level of a private good and the level of a public good, and let i
and r
i be preference relations in the original and rth replica economy, respectively. According to Milleron's
(1972) preference modication, relation r
i is generated such that (x;a) r
i (x0;a0) if (rx;a) i (rx0;a0). In
the quasi-linear economy where i is described by the utility function x+vi(a), this implies vr
i(a) = vi(a)=r.
26Proposition 4. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously dierentiable for any i 2 N
with (i) C(0) = 0, C0(a) > 0, C00(a) > 0, and lima!0 C0(a) = 0, and (ii) v0
i(a) > 0 and
v00
i (a)  0 for all i 2 N. Then, for any  a > 0, there exists a natural number  r( a) such that
for any r   r(a), a(S) <  a holds for any (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP(V r) .
Together with Theorem 1, Proposition 4 immediately implies the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously dierentiable for any i 2 N with
(i) C(0) = 0, C0(a) > 0, C00(a) > 0, and lima!0 C0(a) = 0, and (ii) v0
i(a) > 0 and v00
i (a)  0
for all i 2 N. Then, the public goods provision levels for all FRP-Core allocations shrink to
zero as the economy is replicated.
Although this result has some similarity to the main result of Healy (2007), the models
and the objectives are very dierent. Unlike our model, Healy requires that all players
(voluntarily) participate in equilibrium, while he does not ask contribution groups to achieve
ecient provision of public goods. Thus, the reasons for the convergence are very dierent
in his and our papers. Note also that unlike Theorems 1 and 2, Theorem 3 (and Proposition
4) relies on concavity and convexity of utility and cost functions, respectively, as well as
dierentiability of them.
7 Conclusion
This paper has added players' participation decisions to a (pure) public goods provision
problem. We propose a free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which is a hybrid solution concept
based on credibility of coalitional deviations. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public
good economy but does not usually achieve global eciency. The FRP-Core has support
from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set
of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) of a
dynamic game with participation decision followed by a common agency contribution game.
With a simple example, we have found that the equilibrium contribution group may not be
27consecutive (with respect to players' willingness-to-pay), and the public good may be under-
provided (compared with the case of voluntary contribution game studied by Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian, 1986, for example). Furthermore, public goods provision level decreases
to zero as the economy grows.
Although we have restricted our analysis to the public goods problem with transferable
utility (assuming that all players have quasi-linear utilities), we can extend our analysis to a
Gorman-form utility function (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983) to allow the (positive) income
eect for the public goods.18 Suppose that player i's preferences are represented by a utility
function of the form ui(a;x) = (a)x + i(a) for all i = 1;:::;n, while the government's
utility is u0(a;x) = (a)(x   C(a)). As long as players have enough endowments such that
their budget constraints would not be binding, the characterization results of Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) extend to this utility specication. We can show that if (a) is nonde-
creasing, and the ratio i(a)=(a) is nondecreasing for all i 2 N, the ecient public good
provision level a(S) is nondecreasing with respect to group expansion, and hence the re-
sulting game (V (S))SN is a convex game. Thus, our equivalence theorem continues to hold
in this class of public good economies. Relaxing the assumption on utility functions (even
further) is of interest, since then we would be able to examine how the income distribution
across players aects free-riding incentives and equilibrium public goods provision levels, for
example. Theorem 1 of our analysis extends to a general NTU game, indeed. In order to
obtain our main equivalence result, however, we have appealed to the results obtained by
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) who analyze TU games. Thus, we rst need to extend their
analysis to NTU games to examine the equivalence between the FRP-Core and PCPNE. We
leave this interesting and nontrivial exercise to our future research.
18We thank a referee for bringing our attention to this possible extension.
28Appendix A: Preliminary Analysis on the Core of Con-
vex Games
In this appendix, we list a few useful preliminary results on the core of convex games. In
our public goods (comonotonic) domain, the characteristic-function game generated from a
(public goods) economy is convex. Let V : 2N ! R with V (;) = 0 be a characteristic-
function form game. Game V is convex if V (S [T)+V (S \T)  V (S)+V (T) for all pairs
of subsets S and T of N. The core of game V is Core(N;V ) = fu 2 RN :
P
i2N ui = V (N)
and
P
i2S ui  V (S) for all S  Ng. Shapley (1971) analyzes the properties of the core of
convex games in detail. One of his results useful for us is the following.
Property 1. (Shapley, 1971) Let ! : f1;;jNjg ! N be an arbitrary bijection, and
let u!(1) = V (f!(1)g), u!(2) = V (f!(1);!(2)g)   V (f!(1)g),..., and u!(jNj) = V (N)  
V (Nnf!(jNj)g). Then, u = (ui)i2N 2 Core(N;V ), and the set of all such allocations forms
the set of vertices of Core(N;V ).
Now, we consider a reduced game, in which outsiders always join coalitions and walk away
with the payos they could obtain by forming their own coalition. Let T be a proper subset
of N. A reduced game of V on T is ~ VT : 2T ! R such that ~ VT(S) = V (S[(NnT)) V (NnT)
for all S  T. We have the following result.
Property 2. Suppose that V : N ! R is a convex game. Let uNnT = (ui)i2NnT be a core
allocation of a game V : NnT ! R. Then, uT 2 Core(T; ~ VT) if and only if (uT;uNnT) 2
Core(N;V ).
Proof. First, we show that uT 2 Core(T; ~ VT) if (uT;uNnT) 2 Core(N;V ). Since (uT;uNnT) 2
Core(N;V ),
P
i2S[(NnT) ui  V (S [ (NnT)) holds for all S  T. Rewriting this, we
have
P
i2S ui  V (S [ (NnT))  
P
i2NnT ui = V (S [ (NnT))   V (NnT) = ~ VT(S). Thus,
uT 2 Core(T; ~ V ).
29Second, we show that uT 2 Core(T; ~ VT) implies (uT;uNnT) 2 Core(N;V ). Suppose this











Since uT 2 Core(T; ~ V ) and V is a convex game, we have
P
i2S\T ui  V (S [ (NnT))  
V (NnT)  V (S)   V (S \ (NnT)). Substituting this inequality into (2), we have V (S) >
V (S) V (S\(NnT))+
P
i2S\(NnT) ui, which leads to a contradiction since uNnT 2 Core(NnT;V )
implies
P
i2S\(NnT) ui  V (S \ (NnT)). 
Now, we rewrite the core. Let u = (ui)i2N be an arbitrary utility vector. Let
Q




uj > V (S)g;
Q




uj = V (S)g;
Q




uj < V (S)g:
That is, sets Q+(u) and Q (u) denote the collections of coalitions in which players as a whole
are satised and unsatised (in the strict sense) with the utility vector u, respectively. The set
Q0(u) is the collection of coalitions in which players are just indierent collectively between
deviating and not deviating. Obviously, a utility vector u is in the core, i.e., u 2 Core(N;V ),
if and only if Q (u) = ; (or S 2 Q+(u) [ Q0(u) for all S 2 2N) and N 2 Q0(u). Let
(S;u)  [V (S) 
P
i2S ui]=jSj be the (per capita) shortage of payo for coalition S for any
S 2 Q (u). Let
Q
 
max(u)  fS 2 Q
 (u) : (S;u)  (S








Using the above denitions, we now construct an algorithm that starts from an arbitrary
utility vector u and terminates with a core allocation ^ u.
30Algorithm. Let u 2 RN and let V : N ! R be a convex game. Let u(t) be the utility
vector at stage t 2 R+, and u(0) = u (the initial value).
(a) Suppose Q (u) = ;. Then, 2Nnf;g = Q0(u) [ Q+(u). If N 2 Q0(u(0)), then the
algorithm terminates immediately. Otherwise,
P
i2N ui > V (N) holds, and we reduce
each ui for i 2 Nn([S2Q0(u)S) continuously at a common speed as t increases.19 Since
all elements in Q0(u) continue to be in Q0(u(t)), while some of elements of Q+(u(t))
switch to Q0(u(t)) in the process, Q0(u(t)) monotonically expands as t increases. Thus,
N 2 Q0(u(^ t)) occurs at some stage ^ t. Then we terminate the process. The nal
outcome is ^ u = u(^ t).
(b) Suppose Q (u) 6= ;. There are two phases, starting with phase 1.
i. Phase 1: Start with u(0) = u. For all i 2 Q 
max(u(t)), increase ui continuously at
a common speed. Terminate this phase of the algorithm when Q 
max(u(t)) = ; (or
Q (u(t)) = ;), and call such t as ~ t.20
ii. Phase 2: Now, Q (u(~ t)) = ;. Then, we go to the procedure in (a), and we reach
a nal outcome ^ u = u(^ t) when N 2 Q0(u(^ t)) occurs. 
Let Q0(u)  [S2Q0(u)S, and dene
W  fi 2 N : 9t  0 with i 2 Q
 
max(u(t)) in phase 1 of case (b)g;
I  fi 2 N : i 2 Q
0(u(0)) in case (a), or i 2 Q
0(u(~ t))nW in case (b)g;
L  fi 2 N : i = 2 Q
0(u(0)) in case (a), or i = 2 Q
0(u(~ t)) in case (b)g:
These sets will be shown to be collections of players who gain, remain indierent, and lose
in the above algorithm relative to the initial value u, respectively. By the construction of
the algorithm, the following Lemma is straightforward.
19It follows from the denition of a convex game that [Q2Q0(u)Q = N implies N 2 Q0(u). To prove this
claim, it suces to show that if T;T 0 2 Q0(u), then T [T0 2 Q0(u) when Q (u) = ; as is assumed. We have





Since T \ T0 2 Q0(u) [ Q+(u),
P
i2T\T 0 ui  V (T \ T0). Together with the above inequality, this implies
V (T [ T0) 
P
i2T[T 0 ui. Since Q (u) = ;, T [ T0 2 Q0(u).
20This process guarantees that every player i 2 Q 
max(u(t)) at some stage t 2 [0;~ t] must belong to some
S0 2 Q0(u(~ t)) at the end of phase 1.
31Lemma 1. Set N is partitioned into W, I, and L: ^ ui > ui for all i 2 W, ^ ui = ui for all
i 2 I, and ^ ui < ui for all i 2 L.
Proof. Note that the payo for any player in W does not change in phase 2 of case (b) as
W  [S2Q0(u(~ t))S. Thus, for all i 2 W, ^ ui > ui. Given this, the rest is obvious. 
This lemma identies the winners, unaected players, and losers of the algorithm as sets W,
I, and L, respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider the above algorithm. In phase 1 of case (b), Q 
max(u(t)) monotonically
expands as t increases for t 2 [0;~ t). This phase terminates with Q (u(~ t)) = ;. Moreover,
W = limt!~ t Q 
max(u(t)) 2 Q0(u(~ t)), and W 2 Q0(u(^ t)).
Proof. As t increases, the payos of all members of Q 
max(u(t)) increase at the same speed;
thus for any S 2 Q 
max(u(t)), (S;u(t)) decreases at the same speed. Note that for all other
coalitions T = 2 Q 
max(u(t)), (T;u(t)) decreases at a slower pace (if T \ Q 
max(u(t)) 6= ;) or
stays constant (if T \ Q 
max(u(t)) = ;). Therefore, Q 
max(u(t)) monotonically expands as t
increases. This monotonic utility-raising process continues until Q (u(t)) = ; realizes at
t = ~ t. Since Q 
max(u(t)) monotonically expands, W = limt!~ t Q 
max(u(t)) holds.
Now, we will show Q 
max(u) = [S2Q 
max(u)S 2 Q 
max(u), which proves W 2 Q0(u(~ t))
and W 2 Q0(u(^ t)) (in phase 2 of case (b), payos of players in W are not aected). Let
S1;S2 2 Q 












By convexity, it follows that
V (S1 [ S2) + V (S1 \ S2)  V (S1) + V (S2)




















ui   V (S1 \ S2)
















Thus, S1 [ S2 2 Q 




Lemma 3. Starting from any initial value u 2 RN, this algorithm terminates with a core
allocation ^ u 2 Core(N;V ).
Proof. First, we show that case (a) terminates with a core allocation. To this end, we
need only show that [S2Q0(u)S 6= N whenever
P
i2N ui > V (N) (otherwise, the algorithm
terminates with an infeasible u). Suppose to the contrary that
P
i2N ui > V (N), while
[S2Q0(u)S = N in case (a). Let S1;S2;:::;SK 2 Q0(u) be distinct subsets of N with [K
k=1Sk =
N. Then, we have
P
i2S1 ui = V (S1) and
P
i2S2 ui = V (S2). By convexity, V (S1 [ S2) +




i2S2 ui holds. By the construction of the
algorithm, S1 \ S2 2 Q0(u) or S1 \ S2 2 Q+(u), i.e., V (S1 \ S2) 
P
i2S1\S2 ui holds. Thus,
we have V (S1 [ S2) 
P
i2S1[S2 ui. Applying the same argument to S1 [ S2 and S3, we
have V (S1 [ S2 [ S3) 
P
i2S1[S2[S3 ui, since (S1 [ S2) \ S3  S3 implies (S1 [ S2) \ S3 2
Q0(u) or (S1 [ S2) \ S3 2 Q+(u). Repeated application of the same argument generates






i2N ui. This is a contradiction. Thus, in case
(a), the algorithm terminates with a feasible allocation. Since u(t) changes continuously,
N 2 Q0(^ u) holds, and ^ u 2 Core(N;V ).
Now, it follows from Lemma 2 that phase 1 of case (b) terminates with Q (~ u) = ;. Thus,
the same argument as in case (a) applies to phase 2 of case (b), leading to the conclusion
that ^ u 2 Core(N;V ) also in case (b). 
33Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we show that (T;a(T);u0) 2 Core(T) blocking (S;a(S);u) 2 Core(S) implies
a(S) < a(T). Since (S;a(S);u) 2 Core(S), S  T cannot happen. Thus, we have
either (i) S $ T, or (ii) S " T and S # T. Case (i) implies a(S) < a(T), since if
a(S) = a(T), blocking cannot occur (core allocations are ecient for the contribution
group). Thus, consider case (ii). Note that for all i 2 TnS, we have u0
i  ui = vi(a(S)).


















































(T \ S))   C(a






































Since a(S)  a(T), we have u0













j = V (T \ S):
34Since ui = vi(a(S)) = u0
i for all i 2 TnS, none in coalition T is strictly better o by this
deviation (T;a(T);u0). This is a contradiction. Thus, a(T) > a(S) must hold.
Now, with the above result, it is easy to prove the rest. Since (T;a(T);u0) 2 Core(T)
blocks (S;a(S);u) 2 Core(S), and a(T) > a(S), it is clear that (T;a(T);u0) weakly
Pareto-dominates (S;a(S);u). 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Pick a coalition  S that achieves the highest level of public good provision among the coali-
tions that support CoreFRP. There exists such  S, since the number of coalitions is -
nite. By Proposition 1, if (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP(S) is weakly blocked by (T;a(T);u0) 2
CoreFRP(T), then a(S) < a(T). Thus, no allocation in CoreFRP( S) is not weakly blocked
by any other allocations in [S022NCoreFRP(S0). Thus, CoreFRP( S)  [S022NCoreFRP(S0) =
CoreFRP. This implies that CoreFRP is nonempty. 






= f(S;a(S);u) 2 XFRP : 8T  S;8(T;a(T);u0) 2 XFRP;9i 2
T s:t: u0
i < uig. This is a collection of FRP and ecient allocations for S that are immune












 CoreFRP(S) holds. To see the opposite direction, we only need to show
that FRP condition is not binding for nested deviations. For this, notice that a(T)  a(S)
holds for all T  S. That is, vi(a(Tnfig)) < vi(a(Snfig)) holds for all i 2 T, which implies
that if ui  vi(a(Snfig)) then ui  vi(a(Tnfig)) holds for all i 2 T. This implies that
all coalitional deviations that blocks (S;a(S);u) must at least satisfy FRP condition. This












. If for all nonnested T, (S;a(S);u) is not blocked by any (T;a(T);u0) 2
CoreFRP(T), then (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP holds since (S;a(S);u) is immune to nested





holds. Since CoreFRP(T)  XFRP(T) for all T, for an al-




, it needs to be immune to more deviations than




holds. We will show the






CoreFRP(S)  CoreFRP, and T is not nested from S. Suppose that there is (T;a(T);u0) 2
XFRP(T)nCoreFRP(T) such that u0




i < V (T 0). The FRP condition u0
i  vi(a(T 0nfig)) is trivially satised since
u0
i  vi(a(Tnfig)) for all i 2 T 0 and T  T 0. However, this implies that there ex-
ists (T 0;a(T 0);u00) 2 XFRP(T 0) with u00
i > u0






= CoreFRP(S). If (T 0;a(T 0);u00) = 2 CoreFRP(T 0), then again there ex-
ists T 00  T 0 with (T 00;a(T 00);u000) 2 XFRP(T 00) and u000
i > u00






= CoreFRP(S). This process must stop since T  T 0  T 00 
::: and XFRP(fig) = CoreFRP(fig) = (fig;a(fig);vi(a(fig) C(fig);(vj(afig))j6=i). Thus,
there exists T 000  T, and (T 000;a(T 000);u0000) 2 CoreFRP(T 000) that blocks (S;a(S);u). This
proves that whenever (S;a(S);u) is blocked by nonnested T via (T;a(T);u0) 2 XFTP(T),
it is also blocked by some T 000  T via (T 000;a(T 000);u0000) 2 CoreFRP(T 000). This completes





Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we construct a strategy prole , which will be shown to support (S;a(S);u),
where u 2 CoreFRP(S), as a PCPNE. In dening , we assign a CPNE utility prole to
every subgame S0. Then, we show by way of contradiction that there is no credible and
protable deviation from .
A strategy prole in the second stage 2 is generated from utility allocations assigned in
each subgame (we utilize truthful strategies that support utility outcomes). We partition the
set of subgames S = fS0 2 2N : S0 6= ;g into three categories: S1 = fSg on the equilibrium
path, S2 = fS0 2 S : S0 \ S = ;g, and S3 = fS0 2 SnS1 : S0 \ S 6= ;g. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S0 corresponds to a core allocation for
36S0. In order to support the equilibrium path (S;a(S);u), we need to show that there is
no credible deviation in the rst stage. Since a credible deviation requires both free-riding-
proofness and protability, utility level  ui = maxfu
i;vi(S0nfig)g plays an important role as
to whether or not player i joins a coalitional deviation.
We construct a core allocation for subgame S0 with the algorithm described in the Ap-
pendix A, starting with the initial value  u. Then we show that if there exists a credi-
ble deviation by coalition T, which induces (S0;a(S0);u0) from (S;a(S);u), then (S n
S;a(S nS);(u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0 nS)))j62S0nS) 2 CoreFRP(S0 nS) and Pareto-dominates
(S;a(S);u). This is a contradiction to the presumption that (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP.
Thus, we will conclude that there is no credible deviation from (S;a(S);u).
The construction of the core allocation for each subgame is as follows.
1. We assign (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP to the on-equilibrium subgame S.
2. For any S0 with S0 \ S = ;, we assign an extreme point of the core for S0 of a
convex game. For an arbitrarily selected order ! over S0, we assign payo vector
u!(1) = V (f!(1)g)   V (;), u!(2) = V (f!(1);!(2)g)   V (f!(1)g), and so on, following
Shapley (1971). Call this allocation ^ uS0 2 Core(S0;V ) (see Property 1 in the Appendix
A).
3. For any S0 with S0 \ S 6= ;, we assign a core allocation in the following man-
ner. It requires a few steps. First, we deal with the outsiders S0 n S. Let ! :
f1;;jS0nSjg ! S0nS be an arbitrary bijection, and let ^ u!(1) = V (f!(1)g), ^ u!(2) =
V (f!(1);!(2)g)   V (f!(1)g);; ^ u!(jS0nSj) = V (S0nS)   V ((S0nS)nf!(jS0nSj)g).
Such a core allocation minimizes the total payos for S0nS (Shapley, 1971). The
rest V (S0)   V (S0nS) goes to S0 \ S. Consider a reduced game of (S0;V ) on
S0 \ S with uS0nS as given above and ~ VS0\S : 2S0\S ! R such that ~ VS0\S(Q) =
V (Q[(S0nS)) 
P
j2S0nS uj = V (Q[(S0nS)) V (S0nS). By Property 2, we know
that uS0\S 2 Core(S0 \ S; ~ VS0\S) if and only if (uS0\S;uS0nS) 2 Core(S0;V ). For
each i 2 S0 \ S, let  ui = maxfu
i;vi(S0nfig)g. By the algorithm in Appendix A, we
37construct a core allocation ^ uS0\S from vector  uS0\S = ( ui)i2S0\S for the reduced game
~ VS0\S of game V : 2S0 ! R.
We support these core allocations by truthful strategies. Let 1
i = 1 for i 2 S, and 1
i = 0
for i = 2 S. Let 2
i[S] be a truthful strategy relative to a(S) such that 2
i[S](a(S)) =
vi(a(S))   u
i for all i 2 S, and let 2
i[S0] be a truthful strategy relative to a(S0) with
2
i[S0](a(S0)) = vi(a(S0))   ^ ui(S0) for all i 2 S0. Since a core allocation with truthful
strategies is assigned to every subgame, it is a CPNE. If there is a deviation from , therefore,
it must happen in the rst stage.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists a coalition T that protably and credibly
deviates from the equilibrium . Note that in the reduced game played by T, it must be a
PCPNE deviation with 0
T for given  T. In the original equilibrium, S is the contribution
group. This implies that every i 2 (NnS)nT plays 1
i = 0, i.e., free-riding, in the rst stage,
while every i 2 SnT plays 1
i = 1 in the rst stage and engages in the same strategy, i.e.,
the prescribed menu 2
i(S0) contingent to group S0, in the second stage. Any i 2 TnS has
chosen 1
i = 0 but chooses 10
i = 1 upon deviation in the rst stage. Whereas i 2 T \S may
or may not choose 10
i = 1. Some may choose to free-ride by switching to 0, while others
stay in the contribution group, adjusting their strategies in the second stage. To summarize,
let S0 be the contribution group formed as a result of T's deviation, i.e., S0 = S(1
 T;10
T ).
Then, there are ve groups of players to be considered (see Figure 1).
(i) the members of SnS0  T that switch to free-riding after the deviation,
(ii) the members of S0nS  T that join the contribution group upon deviation,
(iii) the members of (S \ S0)nT  S0 that still participate in the contribution group after
the deviation, with the same prescribed menu in the second stage,
(iv) the members of (S \ S0) \ T  S0 that change their strategies in the second stage,
(v) the members of Nn(S0 [ S) that are outsiders both before and after the deviation.
38Let the resulting allocation be (S0;a(S0);u0). Since the deviation is protable and credi-
ble, the members of T, i.e., those who are categorized in (i), (ii), and (iv) are better o after















i   ui for all i 2 (S
 \ S
0) \ T,
where  ui = maxfu
i;vi(a(S0nfig)g.
Given our supposition, the following claims must be true.
First we claim that members of (ii) exist and that a(S0) > a(S) as they are better o
after the deviation. The set of players in (ii) is nonempty, since otherwise S0  S and a
coalitional deviation by T cannot be protable as (S;a(S);u) is a core allocation. This
result is from Proposition 1.
Claim 1. S0nS 6= ; and a(S0) > a(S).
Since all players use truthful strategies in the strategy prole  even after T's deviation,
the members in (iii) (outsiders of T) obtain the same payo vector ^ u(S\S0)nT(S0) as in the
original subgame CPNE for S0. It is because in subgame S0 (even after deviation), a(S0)
must be provided as a CPNE (core) must be assigned to the subgame. Thus, we have the
following for group (iii).
Claim 2. After the deviation by T, every i 2 (S \ S0)nT  S0 receives exactly u0
i = ^ ui.




i  V (S0nS) for uS0 to be in Core(S0;V ). By the construction of ^ uS0,
on the other hand, we have
P





i  V (S0nS) =
P
i2S0nS ^ ui.







Proof of Claim 4. Group (iv) consists of members of W, I, and L. Note that u0
i   ui for
any i 2 S0 \ S \ T since otherwise they would have no incentive to join the deviation.
First consider the set W of winners in group (iv); we have ^ ui   ui by the denition of









where the equality holds by Lemma 2. As for players in I, we have ^ ui =  ui by denition.
Thus, it follows from u0
i   ui that u0
i  ^ ui for any i 2 I. Payos for losers, by denition,
must satisfy ^ ui <  ui, so we have u0
i > ^ ui because u0




































i2S0\S\T ^ ui. 






i2S0nS ^ ui = V (S0nS).
The nal claim follows from Claim 5 and the supposition that the deviation by T is
protable and credible.
Claim 6. Consider a deviation by S0 [ S such that S0 n S is the resulting contribu-
tion group (all members in S stop contributing). Then the allocation (S0 n S;a(S0 n
S);(u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0nS)))j= 2S0nS) is in CoreFRP(S0nS) and Pareto-dominates (S;a(S);u).




























i2S0nS vi(a(S)), and hence a(S0nS) > a(S).
Now, since the deviation by T is credible, and hence u0
i  vi(a(S0 nfig))  vi(a((S0 nS)n
fig)) for any i 2 S0 n S, Claim 5 implies that (S0 n S;a(S0 n S);(u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0 n
S)))j= 2S0nS) 2 CoreFRP(S0 n S).
Next, we show that ((u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0 n S)))j= 2S0nS) Pareto-dominates u. First, the
protability of the deviation by T immediately implies that u0
i  vi(a(S)) = u
i for any
i 2 S0 n S. Thus, we have shown the Pareto-domination for group (ii). Pareto-domination
for group (v) is immediate from a(S0 n S) > a(S). As for groups (i), (iii), and (iv), i.e.,
for all i 2 S, we rst note that since u 2 Core(S) and the game V is convex, we have
u
i  V (S)   V (Snfig) (Shapley, 1971). Now,
V (S















































where the last inequality holds since
P
j2Snfig vj(a) C(a) is maximized at a = a(Snfig).
This proves that all members of groups (i), (iii), and (iv) are better o in the allocation
(S0nS;a(S0nS);(u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0nS)))j= 2S0nS). Hence, we conclude that (S;a(S);u) 2
CoreFRP is Pareto-dominated by (S0nS;a(S0nS);(u0
i)i2S0nS;(vj(a(S0nS)))j= 2S0nS), which
is in CoreFRP(S0nS). 
The statement of Claim 6 is an apparent contradiction to (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP
(see Proposition 2). Thus, we have shown that there is no protable and credible deviation
from the constructed strategy prole , so  is a PCPNE. 
41Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose to the contrary that for any natural number l, there exists r  l such that
(Sr;a(Sr);u
r) 2 CoreFRP(V r) and a(Sr)   a. This implies that there exists an increasing
sequence of natural numbers r that satisfy (Sr;a(Sr);u
r) 2 CoreFRP(V r). We show that
(under this supposition) for any r with (Sr;a(Sr);u
r) 2 CoreFRP(V r) and any iq 2 Sr,









diminishes to zero (since v0
i(a(S))  v0
i( a) < 1). Since C(a(S))  C( a) > 0, this im-
plies that (1) is violated eventually as r ! 1, which in turn leads to a contradiction to
(Sr;a(Sr);u
r) 2 CoreFRP(V r).
Now, a(Sr), the public goods provision level induced by the contribution group Sr, is















iq(a). For any r, the left-hand side of (5) is continuous and
strictly decreasing in the public goods provision level a since v00
j  0 and C00 > 0 (as Figure
2 illustrates). Similarly, for any iq 2 Sr, the optimality of public goods provision requires








(Sr n fiqg))   C
0(a















(Sr n fiqg)) = 0;
where the second term in the second equation represents the free-rider iq's marginal benet
from the public goods provision.















(Sr)   ) > 0;
42i.e., the left-hand side of (6), evaluated at a = a(Sr)    instead of a(Sr n fiqg), is positive
as Figure 2 shows. Together with v00
j  0 and C00 > 0, this implies that a(Sr n fiqg) 2
(a(Sr)   ;a(Sr)), which in turn implies the convergence of a(Sr n fiqg) to a(Sr).
To show the claim, we rst dene the minimum C00 over the relevant range as c 
mina2[0;a(N)] C00(a). It follows from C00 > 0 that c > 0. Now, for any r, it follows from (5)


















































where we have used v00
j  0 to derive the last inequality. On the other hand, it follows from
v0
i(a(Sr)   )  v0










































(Sr n fiqg))] ! 0 as r ! 1:
Since C(a(S)) > C( a) > 0, we have shown that there exists  r( a) such that for any r   r( a),
the free-riding-proofness condition (1) fails to be satised, which implies that a(S) <  a for
any (S;a(S);u) 2 CoreFRP(V r) when r   r( a).
43Appendix C
In this appendix, we provide some logical relationships between PCPNE of our game and
other equilibrium concepts of (possibly other) noncooperative coalition formation games.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the TU game generated from the public goods
provision game is not only a convex game but also a strictly convex game (i.e., inequalities
are strict). This is not at all a restrictive assumption when the public good space is the
nonnegative real line.
First note that even within our game, PCPNE is dierent from a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) with a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) assigned to each sub-
game (i.e., a Nash equilibrium in the participation game with a CPNE assigned to each
subgame of the contribution stage). In PCPNE, when a group of players deviate in the rst
stage, they can coordinate their strategies in the following subgames in order to support a
target outcome (as long as such deviation strategy prole is credible in the recursive sense).
In contrast, in SPNE, only a single player can change her strategy in the rst stage and
also in the following subgame. Since an equilibrium strategy is taken in each subgame, the
deviating player has no incentive to switch her strategies in the subgames. Thus, given
that a CPNE is assigned to every subgame, we need only check if there exists a unilateral
deviation incentive in the rst stage in order to see if a given strategy prole for the entire
game is SPNE. This distinction makes a big dierence. In the following, we will compare the
set of equilibrium outcomes of various rules of games including (noncooperative) coalition
bargaining games.
In this paper, we have analyzed CoreFRP(S) for S  N, CoreFRP, and PCPNE of our
voluntary-participation game with common agency games as the second-stage subgames. Re-
call that we have found that PCPNE of our game is equivalent to CoreFRP and CorehXFRPi.
Here, we consider the following other possible games and equilibrium concepts:
1. SPNE with CPNE of the common agency game, i.e., Nash equilibrium (NE) of our
voluntary-participation game with CPNE assigned to each common agency subgame.
442. SPNE with the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) of the common agency game, i.e., NE of
our voluntary-participation game with SNE assigned to each common agency subgame.
3. Perfect strong Nash equilibrium (PSNE), i.e., SNE of our voluntary-participation game
with SNE assigned to each common agency subgame.
4. SPNE with the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) of Perry and
Reny's (1994) or Moldovanu and Winter's (1995) noncooperative coalition bargaining
games in the second stage that follows the voluntary participation game in the rst
stage.
We restrict our attention to the open-membership participation game in the rst stage since
voluntary participation in the common agency contribution game is of our primary interest.
We will show the logical relationship that is schematically described in Figure 3.
Claim 1. Games 1, 2, and 4 generate a common set of outcomes that includes PCPNE =
CoreFRP of our game. This inclusion relationship is strict in general.
Proof. In our common agency (sub)game, the set of CPNE outcomes, the set of SNE
outcomes, and the core of the TU game generated from our public good economy are all
equivalent. Perry and Reny (1994) show that the core of a TU game is implementable
by a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game when it is totally balanced. Similarly,
Moldovanu and Winter (1995) show that the core of an NTU game is implementable by
their noncooperative coalitional bargaining game when the NTU game has nonempty core
in all subgames. Thus, in the subgame S  N of games 1, 2 and 4 generate Core(S). The
sets of outcomes of these three games are the same, since the Nash equilibrium concept is
adopted in the rst stage voluntary participation game of all the three.
As for the comparison with PCPNE = CoreFRP, it is clear that every PCPNE allocation
is included in the outcome allocations of the above three games, since the perfectness of
PCPNE is more demanding than Nash equilibrium.
We show that this inclusion relationship is strict with the example in the main text.
Since the TU game generated from the public goods provision problem is convex, we can
45utilize Property 1 of the Appendix A (Shapley, 1972). That is, the worst core allocation for
each player i is V (fig) in any convex games. First, consider singleton coalition S = f11g
as the contribution group. In this case, a(f11g) = 11 and V (f11g) = 60:5. The unique
allocation of Core(S) is (S;a(S);u) = (f11g;11;(60:5;55;33;11)). Although it does not
belong to CoreFRP (or the set of allocations in PCPNE), we can support it as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of games 1, 2, and 4. Since the participation stage just demands
being a Nash equilibrium in these three games, we only need to consider three subgames
S0 = f11;1g; S00 = f11;3g; and S000 = f11;5g, which yield V (S0) = 72, V (S00) = 98, and
V (S000) = 128, respectively. We assign an extreme point of the core to each of subgames
S0, S00, and S000: (u0
11;u0
1) = (71:5;0:5), (u00
11;u00
3) = (93:5;4:5), and (u000
11;u000
5 ) = (115:5;12:5),
respectively. Clearly, none of 1; 3, and 5 has an incentive to deviate. Thus, the allocation
(S;a(S);u) = (f11g;11;(60:5;55;33;11)) is in SPNE of games 1, 2 and 4. 
Claim 2. Game 3 generates the set of outcomes that is included in PCPNE = CoreFRP
of our game. Moreover, it is empty unless there is a grand coalition free-riding-proof core
allocation.
Proof. Clearly, PSNE  PCPNE since SNE  CPNE. In the public goods pro-
vision problem, for all S $ N and all (S;a(S);u) 2 Core(S), there is an allocation
(N;a(N);u0) 2 Core(N) with u0 > u; the grand coalition with this allocation blocks the al-
location (S;a(S);u). Thus, unless there is an FRP-Core allocation with the grand coalition,
PSNE is an empty set. 
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T : Deviating coalition (i) + (ii) + (iv) 
S* : Equilibrium lobby 
S’ : Off-equilibrium lobby 
Figure 1. A Deviation from 
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Figure 3. Relationships with other equilibrium concepts 